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The increase in juvenile violence in Argentina since the 1990s results from a combination of economic and socio-structural change and the reinstatement of repressive 
traditions that became particularly engrained in the armed and security forces during the 1976–1983 dictatorship. Growing unemployment and poverty led to the emerg-
ence of loose webs of juvenile delinquency, while increasing public concern about violent crime led to a revival of harsh “iron fist” policing measures by security forces 
that are often themselves involved in crime in connivance with local politicians. Groups of young urban poor (calling themselves Pibes Chorros or Crooked Kids) and the 
security forces regard one another with mutual hostility, and police/civilian casualties increased over the period. The music of the Crooked Kids, Cumbia Villera, expresses 
their life experience. From a comparative perspective, the absence of institutionalized gangs sets Argentina apart from other countries in Latin and North America.
The growth of crime rates and the increase in lethal police/
civilian encounters during the 1990s in Argentina cannot 
be understood without considering two specific underlying 
processes. On the one hand, the transformations of the so-
cial structure (growing unemployment and poverty) that 
started under the military dictatorship (1976–1983), but 
had its most profound effects in the 1990s. On the other 
hand, the repressive traditions that accrued throughout the 
institutional histories of the local security forces. Although 
these traditions had been part of the institutional culture 
of these organizations since their beginnings, they were 
consolidated during the 1976–1983 military dictatorship 
and re-invigorated in the 1990s because of the increasing 
corruption of the political system and the mano dura or 
“iron fist” security policies applied in that decade.
In line with this standpoint we propose, firstly, that the 
growth of delinquency rates was mainly associated with 
prolonged and very profound changes in the social struc-
ture. Growing unemployment and poverty during the 
1980s and into the 1990s brought forth a growing mass of 
marginalized youth increasingly alienated from basic social 
institutions such as the labour market, stable nuclear 
families or the educational system. These adolescents, so-
cialized mainly in peer groups, progressively developed a 
confrontational identity where breaking the law and chall-
enging conventional social institutions became core ele-
ments of identification. However, in contrast with what 
happened in other parts of Latin America these groups did 
not developed into stable or institutionalized gangs, but re-
mained as loose webs of juvenile delinquency with no 
stable or extended organizational structures. In this sense, 
Argentina shows important differences to other countries 
in the region. Even if, as we will show later on, it shares 
some of the characteristics of other Latin American coun-
tries, the presence and incidence of juvenile criminal gangs 
seem to be smaller than in other regions of the sub-
continent such as Central America or Brazil.1
1 Even if crime rates for all types of crime grew 
significantly in Argentina through the 1980s and 
1990s they did not reach the levels of the more viol-
ent countries in the region. According to the World 
Bank Homicide Data Set 1980–2008, while Argentina 
showed rates between 6.74 and 9.39 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants per year during the 1990s, Brazil 
had rates between 25.30 and 29.25 and Mexico be-
tween 25.27 and 19.47 (Colombia 57.00–68.90; 
Ecuador 10.75–25.90; El Salvador 40.95–34.79; Gu-
atemala 35.00–25.20). Not all these homicides were 
committed by juveniles, but in the countries with 
higher murder rates there is a strong presence of 
“institutionalized juvenile gangs” (for a a more pre-
cise definition see below).
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Secondly, the growth in crime rates increasingly favoured a 
social atmosphere that permitted the reinstatement of 
traditions that had become ingrained in the repressive or-
gans of the state, the military and the police, throughout 
their history, but especially during the 1976–1983 dictator-
ship. The appearance of groups of young urban poor cal-
ling themselves Pibes Chorros (Crooked Kids) and 
assuming the habitual practices of marginalized youth – 
addiction to drugs, disorganized but violent crime and a 
demeanour of confrontation with conventional society (a 
“style” that involved specific tattoos, clothes and gestures) 
– increased the demands for citizen security through re-
pressive “iron fist” policies which favoured the use of force 
and tough measures to deter crime.
In this context the traditional discourse of the armed and 
security forces that divided the population into the morally 
upright defenders of the legal order and the “enemies of 
Argentine society” found new fertile soil. Where commu-
nists, left wing Peronists and union leaders had tradition-
ally been defined as “public enemies” by the security and 
armed forces, during the 1990s the Crooked Kids took their 
place as a new social menace. Thus the demands for iron 
fist policies and the constitution of new forms of alterity, 
gave the security forces a context in which to re-deploy 
their repressive methods.
However, the ambivalent traditions of the Argentine armed 
and security forces involved not only a supposedly strict 
defence of the legal order but also the violation of civil 
rights and even of criminal law. Historically, the police in 
connivance with the political administrations had par-
ticipated in the illegal regulation of crime. But although 
this “administration” of illegal activities such as pros-
titution, informal commerce or gambling had always been 
mechanisms through which the police and political ad-
ministrators obtained extra funds to finance their organiz-
ations and increase their personal earnings, during the 
1990s this type of “illegal business” was extended to other 
activities with a greater impact on society at large, like the 
illegal arms market, drug trade or “road pirates”.2
Therefore, the increase in crime rates and especially the pro-
liferation of certain types of violent crime were not only due 
to the growing marginalization of deprived youth, but also 
to the increasing participation of members of the police 
forces and the political system in the organization of crimi-
nal activities.3 Often the collusion between the police and 
elements of the political system involved the exploitation of 
adolescents in conflict with the law who were used as cheap 
labour (for example as drug pushers or car thieves) for a 
small part of the benefits. Hence, the confrontation between 
the forces of order and these groups of adolescents did not 
only grow out of the defence of the law undertaken by legal 
institutions. Confrontations also arose because adolescents 
often resented and resisted being used by the police and 
politicians in their corrupt schemes. In our view both the 
perception of the police as a quintessential enemy (that the 
Crooked Kids express in their style and in their music) and 
the increase in police/civilian casualties that took place in 
the 1990s resulted largely from this state of affairs.
This process seems to have peaked during the 1990s. Prior 
to that decade crime rates, although slightly rising, had not 
been a major issue in Argentine society, while police/
civilian casualties actually experienced a significant de-
crease during the second half of the 1980s. Similarly, after 
the initial years of the twenty-first century property crime 
rates and police/civilian casualties also experienced a sub-
stantial decrease. Hence, we may state that a particular 
“formation of violence” (Feldman 1991) emerged in Ar-
gentina during the 1990s, but waned progressively during 
the initial years of the twenty-first century as institutional 
and social conditions improved.
2 “Road pirates” is the informal name given to 
those who steal trucks with consumer durables to 
sell them on the black market.
3 Although there are many possible definitions of 
violence, in this text we use its narrower sense, as the 
“use of physical force” to eliminate, subdue or in-
timidate others (Riches 1986). In this case lethal 
confrontations between the security forces and civi-
lians (mainly poor adolescents from the city suburbs 
in conflict with the law) are the most prominent, al-
though not the exclusive, manifestation of the 
growth of violence during the 1990s in Argentina. 
Additionally, although not all forms of crime involve 
the use of physical force, the type of crimes com-
mitted by marginalized youngsters frequently in-
volves this type of violence. Hence, although delin-
quency is not always violent it does constitute a con-
text where violence frequently emerges. Therefore 
the growth in crime rates may be considered a meto-
nymic expression for the growth of violence.
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According to Feldman, formations of violence develop be-
tween actors that represent the official social order and the 
law – the forces of order and the state– and other actors 
that explicitly or implicitly question that order. In these 
contexts actors reciprocally define each other as irreconcil-
able enemies. Not only does each perceive the other as an 
occasional menace to its own security; in this dynamic the 
“other” constitutes a threat to the complete moral order 
and lifestyle of its opponent and thus, in this logic, “de-
serves” to be violently eradicated. Since these reciprocal de-
finitions between social actors mutate over time, formations 
of violence represent “moments” in a historical process where 
systems of social relationships and patterns of social inter-
action are defined and redefined. Hence formations of vi-
olence may appear and dissolve again in temporal patterns 
of confrontation, as seems to have happened in Argentina 
in the 1990s.
 In order to expose the processes that underlie the formation 
of violence that arose during the 1990s in Argentina we will 
proceed, firstly, by examining the structural transformations 
that produced new forms of poverty and marginalization and 
created the conditions for the emergence of groups of young 
urban poor in conflict with the law. Secondly, we will show 
the processes that constituted the institutional traditions and 
cultures of repression in the local armed and security forces 
and the conditions of their re-emergence in the 1990s which 
led to a growing rate of police/civilian casualties. Thirdly, we 
will describe the identity that “defines” the Crooked Kids and 
show how it confronts the legal order, particularly as express-
ed by politicians and the police. Finally, we will show how 
these elements combined in a particular formation of viol-
ence and provide hypotheses to explain the differences be-
tween Argentina and other Latin American countries.
1. Central Aspects of the Structural Crisis
The structural transformations Argentina has experienced 
since the mid-1970s originated in an increase in un-
employment and poverty. Since the mid-1970s a combination 
of low levels of productivity in the industrial sector and the 
economic “open market” policies applied by the 1976–1983 
dictatorship and through the 1980s meant that Argentina was 
unable to generate sufficient jobs to include the new gener-
ations in the labour market. Unemployment consequently 
grew through the 1980s, especially among less qualified young 
people looking for their first jobs. These negative tendencies 
were aggravated under President Carlos Menem (1989–1995 
and 1995–1999) when the open market policies were com-
bined with the privatization of several public utilities (elec-
tricity, fuel, telephone services, etc.), which led to massive 
redundancies and increasing levels of unemployment. Labour 
rights were also reduced, making employment more unstable, 
with more members of the household (especially women and 
children) in the less well-off sectors searching for new jobs to 
guarantee a stable family income. This increased the pressure 
in the labour market that led to a growing unsatisfied demand 
for new jobs (Guadagni et al. 2002 and Becaria 2002 for a thor-
ough account of the process).
Figure I: Unemployment and Poverty in Argentina
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Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC), http://www.indec.gov.ar/.4
Figure 1 shows the persistent growth of unemployment 
through the 1980s and 1990s. Regretfully there are no offi-
cial estimates of the poverty line index before 1988. Private 
estimates (Ferreres 2005: 450–61) show that while salaries 
fell 25 percent in the decade between 1980 and 1990, aver-
age prices of consumer goods increased by 724 percent a 
year (the average rate falls to 285 percent a year if we ex-
clude the hyperinflation years of 1989 and 1990). Given 
that prices rose while salaries fell during that decade, we 
can infer that poverty grew consistently through the 1980s 
as well. At the beginning of the 1990s poverty rates de-
creased for a short period of time due to a recovery of the 
value of incomes immediately after the 1989–1990 hyper-
4 The poverty line has only been measured since 
1988. As of 2007 INDEC changed its measurement 
methods, so the data is not comparable with pre-
vious years.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 240– 260
Isla and Míguez: Formations of Violence in Post-Dictatorial Contexts 244
inflation.5 But this was followed by a persistent growth of 
poverty until the initial years of the twenty-first century. As 
of 2003 the negative economic tendencies reversed in a 
more favorable international context that resulted from 
higher prices for traditional Argentine exports (essentially 
agricultural commodities) and expanded social welfare po-
licies of the Peronist governments, and the levels of poverty 
and unemployment fell drastically.
Although unemployment grew throughout the 1980s and 
1990s its more notable impact occurred during the latter 
decade. Since initially unemployment rates were rather low, 
their impact among the population was not immediately 
felt. But during the 1990s the rate was consistently in two 
digits, and the level and persistence of unemployment dur-
ing that decade turned it into one of the central worries of 
the population. From 1997 “insecurity” also rose from 
sixth to second place, to become one of the citizens’ princi-
pal preoccupations (Smulovitz 2003: 131).
The persistence of unemployment through the 1980s and 
1990s not only implied an increase in poverty rates but also 
a change in the quality or type of poverty. Until the 
mid-1970s the predominant form of poverty in Argentina 
was of a “transitional” sort: poor people experienced up-
ward social mobility, and were progressively overcoming 
material deprivation. Since the mid-1970s poverty has be-
come mainly “structural” (poor people having no ex-
pectations of upward mobility) or resulted from 
pauperization (people from the middle classes falling into 
poverty). In this context material deprivation and social 
marginalization turned into permanent instead of transi-
tional states, making them also an “inter-generational” 
phenomenon (Beccaria and Vinocour 1991).
 Throughout this period crime rates grew steadily in line 
with poverty and unemployment. Between 1980 and 2002 
there was a persistent increase in the rates of crime against 
property, which reversed thereafter following the un-
employment curve. Although information for crimes 
against persons is only available after 1990, we find a grow-
ing tendency for the whole period, similar to crimes against 
property and the unemployment and poverty rates. How-
ever, in the case of crimes against persons the tendency 
does not reverse after 2003, showing a weaker association 
with the unemployment and poverty variables.
Figure 2: Evolution of Crime Rates
Source: Data from Sistema Nacional de Informacion Criminal (National Criminal Information 
Service), based on police reports.6
Another interesting element in Figure 2 is that the rate of 
crimes against property increased consistently, with two 
strong peaks during the fiscal and inflationary crises of 
1989–1991 and 2000–2002. By contrast, the rate of crimes 
against persons seems less affected by the crises and shows 
sustained growth for the whole period. Correlation esti-
mates reveal statistically significant levels of association be-
tween these social conditions and crime although, as 
expected, the correlation is somewhat weaker in the case of 
crimes against persons.7
5 Inflation decreased dramatically at the begin-
ning of the 1990s: from 2314 percent in 1990 to 171 
percent in 1991 and just 4.2 percent in 1994. This 
explains the relative recovery of real income and the 
transitory reduction of the poverty rate during those 
years.
6 Recording of rates of crime against persons 
began in 1990 when the Dirección Nacional de 
Política Criminal (national office of criminal po-
licies) was created, but in 2007 the Ministry of Jus-
tice instructed it to stop making crime rates public.
7 There is already a vast literature showing that 
property crimes tend to be more associated with un-
employment than crimes against persons, since in 
the latter case the motivations are more diverse than 
material deprivation and social marginalization (see 
Chiricos 1987 for a thorough analysis of the unem-
ployment/crime association).
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Other, complementary studies show that the crimes regis-
tered in these statistical records involve mainly young 
males under 25 years of age from poor urban slums (Daro-
qui and Guemureman 2001; Guemureman 2002). Analyses 
of judicial sources also produce similar results. The cor-
relation estimates for criminal counts of juveniles under 18 
with the unemployment rate and the poverty line are 0.781 
(p=0.05) and 0.626 (p= 0.05) respectively (Míguez 2008: 
89). In addition, the social profile of the involved juveniles 
shows that they come mostly from poor urban enclaves of 
the major Argentine cities, in particular Buenos Aires. For 
example, Mariana Roigé (2010: 175) found that material 
deprivation (poverty) was a recurrent factor present in 90 
percent of the households of juveniles with penal processes 
in the state of Buenos Aires.
The reviewed data shows that the structural trans-
formations that Argentina underwent since the mid 1970s 
were associated with a persistent increase in crime rates. 
However, although this quantitative data shows clearly that 
there was an association between structural conditions and 
the evolution of crime rates, they do not show the par-
ticular nexus that underlies this association. More quali-
tative approaches reveal that besides the mere increase in 
the poverty and unemployment rates, the change in the 
type of poverty (from transitional to structural) had a sig-
nificant impact in the expectations and forms of social or-
ganization of the less well off.
Family and ideals of social advancement and integration 
through work and education have always been central te-
nets of the lifestyles of the poor. As Kessler’s investigation 
clearly shows (2000), the increase in structural poverty 
since the mid-1970s and its profound effects in the 1990s 
disarticulated this social complex by obstructing the tradi-
tional channels of social mobility. Structural poverty de-
based familial and local social ties and the foundations of 
personal life-projects. For example, the incidence of single 
parent (mainly female) households grew steadily from 9.4 
to 16.1 percent through the 1980s and 1990s, with a greater 
incidence among the lower income sectors (Torrado 2003: 
440–49). This led to a substantial crisis in traditional forms 
of social integration and a significant increase in the levels 
of social marginalization suffered by the young and poor 
from the urban peripheries (SIEMPRO 2000).
Successive qualitative investigations demonstrate how this 
debasement of the family-work complex constitutes a re-
current element in the trajectories of juvenile delinquents 
(Tonkonoff 2000; Duschaztky and Corea 2002; Kessler 
2002; Míguez 2003). Traditionally family authority was 
conferred to the male head of the household who also 
acted as the main provider. As the experience of un-
employment and structural poverty progressed this role 
suffered growing debasement as all family members began 
to act as providers. Sometimes adolescents even became the 
main providers of the household, thus challenging the 
patriarchal authority (Duschatzky and Corea 2002: 53). In 
this context, there was a substantial change in the moral 
criteria that separate legitimate from illegitimate sources of 
income. Whereas traditionally work was not only the legit-
imate source of the household income but also a dignifying 
experience for those at the bottom of the social ladder, in 
younger generations provision of sufficient income to meet 
the household’s needs became the sole source of legit-
imacy, regardless whether the procured resources came 
from legal or illegal origins (Kessler 2004: 108).
In addition, erosion of familial authority and the de-
structuring of traditional family ties introduced profound 
changes in the process of socialization of the younger gen-
erations. Although during adolescence peer groups are al-
ways a competing socializing force to the family, in these 
new contexts the “street corner society” (Whyte [1942] 
1965) became the main socializing reference for some of 
the adolescents of the poor urban enclaves (Tonkonoff 
1998). The bodily and subjective experience of adolescents 
from poor slums in these contexts is not congruent with 
what is expected from them in the educational system and 
work contexts (Míguez 2002). In many cases interviews 
Table 1: Crime, unemployment and poverty correlates (1980–2007)
* p=0.01 / **p= 0.05 (two-tailed test)
.
Unemployment
Poverty line
Crimes against persons
0.627(**)
0.579(*)
Crimes against property
0.782(**)
0.747(**)
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and ethnographic observation show that the aspiration to a 
stable nuclear family, a proper education and a job has not 
completely disappeared, even in the case of the more mar-
ginalized young urban poor (Kessler 2004: 143; Míguez 
2008: 67). But research also demonstrates that their social-
izing experiences leave them ill prepared for successful per-
formance in the educational and job markets; failure and 
frustration reinforce the tendency to became alienated 
from these (Duschaztky and Corea 2002: 194).
The qualitative research shows how in a context of growing 
material deprivation adolescents from the poor urban 
slums are socialized more frequently by the street corner 
group than in traditional nuclear families. This leaves them 
ill prepared to develop the habits required to build success-
ful educational and working careers. This in turn is as-
sociated with alternative strategies to meet the household 
needs that blur the boundaries between legal and illegal ac-
tivities. Hence the conditions found in qualitative research 
partly explain the processes that underlie the association 
between unemployment, poverty and crime. However, the 
material and familial conditions in which these adolescents 
grow up do not completely account for the particular 
forms of identification and idiosyncrasy that develop 
among them, nor totally explain the specific forms of ac-
tion including delinquency and the use of physical force 
(violence) to confront legal powers such as the police. The 
way in which the security forces enact their repressive 
traditions to control these adolescents is crucial element to 
understanding their forms of perception and action, since 
these develop partly as an adaptive reaction to conditions 
set by the controlling public agents.
2. Repressive Institutional Traditions
As during other dictatorial periods in Argentine history, the 
1976–1983 military dictatorship set out to “rebuild the 
Nation”, naming itself the “National Reorganization Pro-
cess” (Proceso de Reorganización Nacional) and pursuing 
radically reactionary policies to eradicate what the armed 
forces and sectors of the ruling classes had traditionally per-
ceived as the root cause of Argentina’s problems: Peronism, 
its power in the unions, and the dissemination of left-wing 
ideologies. Accordingly, the political activity and rhetoric of 
the military deepened a confrontational logic that had pro-
gressively gained weight in Argentine society since the first 
two Peron presidencies (1946–1952 and 1952–1955). This 
confrontation became even stronger after the overthrow 
and proscription of Peron by the military in 1955.
The military dictatorship increased the social cleavages that 
traditionally divided Argentine society between Peronists and 
anti-Peronists by narrowing the margins of ideological ac-
ceptability to ever more idiosyncratic elements. They reduced 
the ideological scope to two basic stands: the defenders of a 
national ethos expressed in respect for private property, 
strong Christian – Catholic – morals and a patriotic spirit 
versus the immoral supporters of an anti-national ideology 
expressed essentially in communism and left-wing Peronism.
In order to impose its ideological standards on the whole 
population the military concentrated to an extreme extent 
all political power in their own hands and resorted to bru-
tal repressive methods (prison camps, torture, mass murder 
and kidnappings – the infamous “disappearances”). In this 
process the narrowing of the limits of ideological dissent 
were taken to an extreme: all those who did not explicitly 
adhere to the ideological standards set by the military were 
considered at least accomplices of the morally dissolute 
“enemies of the Argentine nation” and thus could legit-
imately be subject to repression and extermination.
 To an extent, the 1976–1983 military dictatorship repre-
sented just one more stage in the evolution of the political 
cleavages that had divided Argentine society since Per-
onism. But the dichotomization produced by the military’s 
redefinition of the ideological frontiers, the extraordinary 
use of force applied in brutal repressive methods and the 
concentration of power that characterized this last military 
dictatorship constituted a qualitative change that had pro-
found consequences for Argentine society.8 In the issue 
8 The effects of the dictatorship were vast and im-
possible to synthesize here, see Marcos Novaro and 
Vicente Palermo (2003) for a thorough account.
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that concerns us here – the constitution of repressive tradi-
tions among the security forces – the conditions enforced 
by the military dictatorship boosted to an extraordinary 
extent the militarization and autonomy of the police. This 
consolidated an institutional culture that while certainly 
not new, gained strength and became so naturalized during 
the dictatorship that it was hard to neutralize after the res-
titution of democracy in 1983.
 The history of the Argentine police, especially in the state 
of Buenos Aires, is permeated by a persistent tension. Ini-
tially created as a largely decentralized force answerable to 
the local authority, one of the central problems was its ten-
dency to act in response to the interests of local political 
forces. This connivance often resulted in corrupt schemes 
where both parties (police and politicians) “administered” 
certain types of illegal activities for personal gain, namely 
gambling, illegal commerce and prostitution. These 
schemes often led to resources provided by the central state 
being diverted to personal accounts, disguised as mainten-
ance costs of police equipment and infrastructure. In ad-
dition, the frequently close ties between local police chiefs 
and politicians resulted in the persecution of dissident 
political elements. Almost since the very beginning, the 
police force has had the “administration” of crime for per-
sonal benefit and the role of intimidating political dis-
sidents as part of its constitutive traditions 
(Kalamanowiecki 2000).
 In order to neutralize these tendencies there were efforts to 
extract the police from the local political sphere and create 
a more professional force under a more centralized ad-
ministration. However, wherever these initiatives were suc-
cessful a new problem would arise, since as the police force 
became increasingly autonomous of political power it de-
veloped its own corporate interests. Instead of complying 
with their role as servants of civil society the police officials 
stressed their function as a means of social control, acting 
essentially as a repressive force and according to their par-
ticular interests and political idiosyncrasy which they tried 
to impose on common citizens.
 This tension was particularly clear in the 1930s when at the 
same time as an effort was made by the leading cadres of 
the ruling Conservative party to professionalize and bring 
the police force under the control of a central adminis-
tration, local political leaders of the same party conspired 
with elements of the police force against these initiatives or 
simply disregarded them (Barreneche 2007a). Furthermore, 
at the same time as the policies of the Conservative Party 
aimed at more professional and centralized security forces, 
they explicitly attributed a political role to the police, perse-
cuting members of the Communist Party and system-
atically deploying elements of the police force to produce 
the electoral frauds that kept them in power through the 
“infamous decade” (as the 1930s were named in allusion to 
the electoral corruption) (Béjar 2005). Hence, the efforts 
for centralization and professionalization were essentially 
fruitless in the face of strong contradictions in the (collec-
tive and individual) political agents that promoted them.
 During the first two presidencies of Perón there were more 
successful initiatives to bring the police under a central ad-
ministration. However this was done under a military 
scheme that transformed the police into an autonomous 
power with very little control by civilian authorities. Al-
though there were efforts to assign the police a welfare role 
complementary to other social services (health, education, 
etc.), the military model reigned making “control” of the 
rival elements of civil society the prevalent component of 
the institutional culture (Barreneche 2007b). However, and 
in spite of a greater centralization and militarization, con-
nivance between local politicians and police officials did 
not completely disappear. At the beginning of the Peron 
era, there were efforts to dismantle these types of police/
political networks, but only because, initially, most com-
munal political leaders belonged either to the Conservative 
Party or to the Partido Radical.9 As the Peronists them-
selves developed their territorial networks, the articulation 
between local political powers and the police regained 
some of its pre-eminence (Barreneche 2010: 49). Increas-
ingly, it was the Peronists – or at least important factions of 
the Peronist Party – who established the more fluid rela-
9 The Partido Radical is a national political party 
founded at the beginning of the twentieth century 
that basically represents the middle classes with a 
moderate social-democratic ideology.
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tionships and systems of reciprocity and connivance with 
the police (Eaton 2008: 20). Moreover, as the Peronist Party 
lost part of its popularity towards the mid-1950s, the use of 
torture and political persecution became common practice 
among the security forces (Call 2002: 11).
 After Peron’s overthrow in 1955 successive civilian and 
military governments continued consolidating the auth-
oritarian institutional traditions on which the 1976–1983 
dictatorship was to base its even more repressive machi-
nery (Pereira and Ungar 2004: 14). These were the (to an 
extent mutually conflictive) tendencies to administrate cer-
tain forms of crime for their own benefit, connivance with 
politicians in this type of manoeuvre, a propensity to be-
come an autonomous force outside the influence of the 
civil powers and acting to control instead of serve civil so-
ciety, and the frequent use of illegal procedures to combat 
crime, such as torture, murder and harassment of the civi-
lian population.
 During the 1976–1983 dictatorship military cadres were 
appointed as heads of the security forces. Particularly in the 
case of the province of Buenos Aires, the methods applied 
under the administration of General Ramón Camps and 
other top-ranking military cadres such as Miguel Etchecol-
atz and Carlos Suarez Mason represented a qualitative 
change in the levels of corruption, autonomy, con-
frontation with civil society and violence deployed by the 
security forces (Dutil and Raggendorfer 1997: 15).
 These military commanders restructured the security 
forces of the state of Buenos Aries, merging them with 
military task groups and promoting the military “dirty 
war” tactics among the other security forces as well. The 
police thus became part of the repressive military appar-
atus, managing several detention camps where political 
prisoners were held for torture and future assassination. In 
most cases, these task groups would appropriate their vic-
tims’ assets as “war bounty” to finance further repressive 
operations. But, progressively, the political purposes pur-
sued by this repressive machinery were substituted by the 
personal economic interests of the top-ranked police and 
military officers. In this way, the repressive operations of 
the security forces progressively turned into economic op-
erations with the main purpose of enlarging the personal 
fortunes of the participating police and military officials 
(Dutil and Raggendorfer 1997: 16).
The repressive military tactics and the resulting in-
stitutional design and practices implemented during the 
dictatorship were not, fundamentally, new to the police. As 
shown, corruption, connivance with the political adminis-
tration, confrontation with civil society and its res-
emblance to a military structure were all elements that had 
accrued as institutional traditions since its origins. How-
ever, during the dictatorship these traditions were taken to 
an extreme. The impunity given by the concentration of 
absolute discretionary power and the unprecedented levels 
of violence and flagrant participation in crime that this 
made possible took the tradition to a new level. While the 
administration of crime had always been part of the prac-
tice of the security forces, especially in “victimless crimes” 
such as gambling or illegal commerce, during the dictator-
ship the security forces became the perpetrators of all sorts 
of felony. They thus became an organizing and ruling force 
that could replace or subordinate common criminal gangs, 
not only administrating but also controlling and promot-
ing most types of criminal activity (Isla 2007a).
After the democratic transition in 1983 several efforts were 
made to reform the police, to restrain corruption, moder-
ate their procedures and limit their autonomy. The first 
elected president after the dictatorship, Raúl Alfonsin 
(1983–1989), sought to pass a law to bring the police under 
civilian control and restrict their discretionary capacity to 
arrest and detain citizens, but the initiative failed because it 
was opposed by the Peronist Party in Congress (Pereyra 
and Ungar 2004: 8). However, during those years citizen se-
curity was not perceived as a central problem and did not 
reign paramount in the political agenda. Hence, the issue 
went more or less unnoticed for much of the public. Dur-
ing the 1990s the situation changed significantly.
The rise in crime rates and the consequent pressure of civil 
society on the political powers to institute more efficient 
policing made citizen security one of the crucial elements 
of the political agenda (Smulovitz 2003: 132). There were 
several efforts during the 1990s to reform the police, both 
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at the federal level and specifically in the case of the state of 
Buenos Aires. Although there were certain timid attempts, 
specially in the state of Buenos Aires, to apply a “commu-
nity policing” model, most security policies followed an 
“iron fist” (mano dura) approach (Pereira and Ungar 2004; 
Fuentes 2005).10 However, the policy failed even in these 
cases, since the strict and violent control of crime that is 
supposed by this approach clashed with the interests of the 
political and police officials who partake in crime. Hence, 
although the iron fist approach favoured the re-emergence 
of the use of force as a repressive tactic, connivance be-
tween the police and important elements of the political 
system made it an inefficient policy for combatting crime 
since “a good proportion of politics [was] financed 
through police corruption” (Ragendorfer 2002: 113; see 
also Klipphan 2004: 35; Saín 2004, 2008).11
As we have established, there had always been connivance 
between the police and the political system in Argentina. 
But, during the 1990s the level of impunity granted by the 
political system to the police in its complicity with the 
criminal underworld introduced a qualitative change. 
Whereas, as reported by Sain (2002), after the return of de-
mocracy police officers shared monies extracted from small 
scale gambling operations and brothels with party leaders, 
“[t]he seriousness of crimes … escalated through time, 
particularly the devastating crises of the late 1980s and the 
economic dislocations of the 1990s” (Eaton 2008: 19). As 
of the mid-1990s, the connivance between the police and 
the political system developed to a point where aside from 
profiting from prostitution and illegal gambling, “traffick-
ing of stolen cars, kidnapping for ransom, trafficking of 
police reports and drug trafficking [composed a] ‘ladder of 
illegality’ that [went] from street-level police officers and 
districts’ political brokers to top rank officers, politicians 
and businessmen” (Fuentes 2004: 11).
Along with the impoverishment and marginalization that 
grew in the 1990s, this institutional context favoured the 
proliferation of crimes with high impact on civil society 
that generated public demands for the iron fist. There was 
a massive increase in the consumption and circulation of 
drugs, leading, by the end of the 1990s, to a huge crack 
trade causing growing levels of interpersonal and delin-
quent violence (Epele 2010). Also, the illegal arms market 
grew considerably, with significant participation of 
members of the armed forces (police and military) acting 
as providers in the illegal weapons circuit. Additionally, 
other illegal activities such as auto theft and kidnappings 
for ransom also grew with the consistent participation of 
important sectors of the police forces as accomplices of 
these types of crime. Good examples of this were the 
Banda de los Comisarios (a gang composed of top police 
officers) who committed kidnappings for ransom, includ-
ing the hijacking of the son of a well-known car industry 
boss (now mayor of Buenos Aires). Also, on several occa-
sions the press discovered that in certain prisons guards 
were selling stolen car parts, releasing inmates for several 
hours to steal the cars that were then dismantled to sell 
the parts.
As part of the systems of reciprocity that were behind these 
crimes the police used poor adolescents from the urban 
outskirts who were in conflict with the law as a cheap 
workforce, sending the adolescents to commit the actual 
crimes (robberies, trafficking, etc.) but retaining the biggest 
share of the booty.
All in all, the current state of research suggests that after 
the dictatorship, at the beginning of the democratic period, 
the police basically returned to the practices of adminis-
trating small-scale and essentially victimless forms of 
crime. Although there were violations of civil rights and 
even new cases of adolescents being ‘disappeared’ from 
rock festivals and political rallies (Tiscornia 2008; Pita 
2010), a public opinion more sensible to the human rights 
cause, reduced levels of social marginalization and the 
relative low crime rates made the problem of citizen secur-
10 See Arzadún (2005) or Camou and Moreno 
(2005) for a detailed account of the police reforms 
in the state of Buenos Aires. Pereira and Ungar 
(2004) and Eaton (2008) provide a more global ac-
count of the processes.
11 We are not implying that iron fist policies would 
necessarily be effective in the absence of corruption, 
but pointing out that in the Argentine case the con-
nivance between political leaders and the police in-
terfered to an extent even with this sort of policy.
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ity less pressing and the actions of the police more moder-
ate. But as social marginalization, corruption and crime 
rates escalated during the 1990s there were increasing de-
mands for citizen security policies.
Paradoxically, initiatives to reform the police, especially 
the iron fist policies applied in the 1990s that called for 
harsh repressive methodologies, facilitated the re-emerg-
ence of some of the worst traditions in the security forces. 
On the one hand, repressive iron fist methodologies re-
vived the authoritarian predispositions that resulted from 
the militarized organization and culture that had long 
been part of the police traditions and that had deepened 
during the dictatorship. But concomitantly, it also streng-
thened the tendency to partake in crime, in connivance 
with elements of the political administration. In addition, 
the impunity given by collusion with the political system 
and the practices with which they had become familiar 
during the dictatorship favoured their participation in 
highly violent criminal organizations applying illegal force 
(harassment, torture, murder) to control and subdue ele-
ments of the criminal underworld. In sum, during the 
1990s the traditions bolstered during the dictatorship were 
revived by the demands for iron fist policies and enabled 
by the levels of impunity provided by collusion with the 
political system.
This form of administrating crime by state officials re-
sulted in very volatile systems of social relationships, where 
there were forms of reciprocity and even collaboration be-
tween the political administration, elements of the security 
forces and members of criminal networks, despite these 
last two sets of actors perceiving themselves as irreconcil-
able enemies. Hence, during the 1990s and at least until the 
change of economic trends and social policies at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, a new formation of viol-
ence was constituted. It opposed the security forces and the 
young marginal poor as lethal enemies. The latter, often in 
conflict with the law, were known as (and called them-
selves) the Pibes Chorros or Crooked Kids.
As shown in Figure 3 the consequences of these ongoing 
conflicts became clearly expressed in growing numbers of 
casualties on both sides (police and civilians) between 1992 
and 2002. But, as we will show in the next section, they 
were also expressed in the confrontational attitude and aes-
thetic style with which the adolescents from the poor 
urban suburbs constituted an identity that defined them in 
opposition to the institutional expressions of the legal 
order and sometimes even to society in general.
12 Regrettably there is no data prior to 1986 or 
after 2009; also data for police casualties is only 
available as of 1996.
Figure 3: Police/civilian Casualties in Metropolitan Buenos Aires
Source: Fuentes (2004: 12); Bazano and Pol (2009: 35), based on data provided by CELS (Cen-
ter for Legal and Social Studies) and Human Rights Watch.12
Figure 3 shows that during the second half of the 1980s 
there was a very significant decrease in civilian casualties 
resulting from confrontations with the police. The years 
that immediately followed the democratic transition of 
1983, through until 1992, were characterized by increasing 
moderation in the levels of force used by the police, and 
also a period of relatively low levels of social conflict and 
crime rates (except for the mass looting during the 
1989–2001 inflationary crises that seem not to have had an 
impact on the number of police/civilian casualties).
After six years of decreasing rates of police/civilian casu-
alties (1986–1991) between 1992 and 2001 there is a clear 
change in the trend. The ten years after 1992 show a per-
sistent increase in the number of police/civilian casualties, 
making the rate for 2001 341 percent higher than in 1992. 
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Although in the case of the police force there is no data 
available prior to 1996, we can observe a similar tendency: 
the rate of casualties in 2002 is 232 percent higher than in 
1997. Exploratory studies suggest that most police/civilian 
casualties occurred in the metropolitan area of Buenos 
Aires, among males between 16 and 21 years of age from 
the less affluent sectors (López et al. 2005: 4). Hence, the 
1990s was a decade where a new formation of violence 
emerged; one which confronted, mainly, the young and 
poor from the urban outskirts with members of the secur-
ity forces, resulting in a growing number of casualties on 
both sides. After 2002 the change in economic trends, the 
decrease in crime rates and the changes in the welfare and 
security policies applied by the government seem to have 
reversed the tendency, and thus produced a decline in the 
levels of confrontation.
Regrettably, the sparse character of the available data (pro-
duced mostly by NGOs based on media reports and with a 
limited regional scope) does not allow us to know if what 
happened in Buenos Aires is similar to what went on in 
other Argentine cities. As mentioned, exploratory studies 
suggest that most violence occurred in the metropolitan 
area of Buenos Aires city, although it is probable that other 
big cities of the interior (like Rosario, Córdoba or Mendo-
za) underwent similar processes. Compared to other Latin 
American cities, during the 1990s Buenos Aires seems to 
have gradually reached or even surpassed the level of po-
lice/civilian casualties of some cities with higher general 
murder rates.13 For example, between 1990 and 1994 Sâo 
Paulo had rates of police/civilian casualties double those of 
Buenos Aires, but between 1995 and 2000 the rates were 
similar: 1.61 annual deaths for every 100,000 inhabitants in 
the first case and 1.63 in the second. Both are far above the 
more violent North American cities, like Los Angeles with a 
police/civilian casualty rate of 0.5 and even Mexico City 
where the rate for that period was less than 1 per 100,000 
inhabitants (Brinks 2003: 6–7).
Altogether, the evolution of the casualty rate suggests that 
during the 1990s the levels of confrontation between ele-
ments of civil society, especially young urban poor, and the 
security forces escalated significantly. As we have shown, 
this was partly due to a re-enactment of the repressive 
traditions that had accrued in the security forces since their 
constitution. These were bolstered during the dictatorship 
and reinvigorated in the 1990s by the relative impunity 
given by the connivance between political powers and the 
police. As a reaction to this situation, the young urban poor 
from the urban outskirts developed a confrontational at-
titude and aesthetic style that identified them as Crooked 
Kids. Paradoxically, this identity reinforced the perception 
of these adolescents as public enemies promoted by the 
supporters of the iron fist policies and the security forces, 
thus reproducing the cycles of violence.
3. Webs of Juvenile Delinquency
As has been shown in classical and recent research, con-
flicts between the institutional representatives of the social 
order and the young urban poor are usually mediated by 
collective systems of representation and practice, expressed 
in confrontational identities embodied in symbols, like ges-
tures, tattoos, clothing, hair and music styles.
A comprehensive study by Hagedorn (2008a) shows that 
national or sub-national contexts may have a great say in 
the particular way in which these identities relate to specific 
organizational forms. That is, the social networks of margi-
nalized youth involved in illegal activities may assume dif-
ferent morphological characteristics according to varying 
influencing factors. In general, Hagedorn relates the prolife-
ration of gangs around the world to the growing levels of 
“polarization, social exclusion and the retreat of the state” 
(2008a: 6).14 The social networks of the young urban poor 
then develop as an answer to these relatively new forms of 
marginalization. Through them adolescents not only create 
a channel to illegally access the material resources that they 
13 According to a comparative study by the Direc-
ción Nacional de Política Criminal (National Office 
for Criminal Policies) of the Argentine Ministry of 
Justice, during the 1990s homicides in Buenos Aires 
averaged 6.70 cases per 100,000 inhabitants per year, 
while the rate was 41.10 for Rio de Janeiro and 20.44 
for Mexico City. Although Buenos Aires had homi-
cide rates substantially lower than in those cities, its 
police/civilian casualties were similar or even higher.
14 Hagedorn refers to the growing social differ-
ences and increasing levels of marginalization result-
ing from neoliberal policies applied on a global 
scale, which produced unemployment, poverty and a 
retreat of the welfare state that formerly guaranteed 
basic living conditions and forms of social inclusion.
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cannot reach through legal means, but they also develop or-
ganizations that allow them to participate in territorial 
power relations and provide them with a meaningful iden-
tity when conventional forms of identification and par-
ticipation are not available (2008a: xxvii).
However, although these forms of reaction to social margi-
nalization are found across the globe they may assume dif-
ferent organizational forms. Hagedorn (2008a: 34) 
distinguishes essentially between institutionalized gangs 
and unsupervised peer groups. In the first case loose net-
works of juveniles involved in illegal activities acquire a 
more stable character expressed in an identity that may be 
passed down from generation to generation. Institutional 
gangs are not necessarily defined by very strict hierarchical 
structures with clearly identified roles. In general, they are 
composed of a loose network of juvenile groups that share 
an identity and participate in common activities, but do not 
necessarily have a centralized organization. Hence, instead 
of necessarily being rational criminal organizations, most 
gangs are “‘living organisms’ instilling in their members, as 
well as the[ir] communit[ies], a belief in the organization 
itself” (Hagedorn 2008a: 9). Although Hagedorn does not 
present a systematic definition of unsupervised peer 
groups, it may be inferred that these are rather small groups 
of marginalized youth who are involved in illegal activities 
but do not belong to any organizational network or express 
a collective identity in specific symbols and practices used 
beyond the immediate group of primary peer relations.
Several factors may contribute to turn unsupervised peer 
groups involved in illegal activities into institutionalized 
gangs. One influencing factor is the drug trade, which 
tends to structure youth in more stable organizations, espe-
cially when they are able to control specific territorial en-
claves where the national state is weak or absent (Covey 
2003; Briceño León and Zubillaga 2007; Zaluar, 2011). In 
these cases, gangs develop as territorialized power networks 
which are able to control urban enclaves, freeing those 
spaces from state control in order to develop their illegal 
business. In exchange for neighbours’ acquiescence, gangs 
often provide the basic public services that the state does 
not deliver (welfare through informal reciprocity networks 
or protection from outside aggression) although this fre-
quently comes at the price of a “reign of terror” that gangs 
impose on their turf and that strongly condition the life of 
its inhabitants (Souza da Silva 2006).
Another factor contributing to the institutionalisation of 
gangs, particularly in South America, has been civil war 
contexts. In many cases the organizational structures devel-
oped by juvenile institutionalized gangs comes either from 
imitation of the organizational structures of guerrilla move-
ments, such as Commando Vermelho in Brazil (Riffiotis 
2007), or by the transformation of former armed political 
organizations into common criminal gangs as in the case of 
the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Perú or FARC and 
M19 in Colombia, or the evolution of guerrilla movements 
into territorial gangs, as it happened in Nicaragua (Zilberg 
2004; Briggs 2007; Hume 2007; Rodgers, 2007).
Classical studies also show that immigration is a strong fac-
tor in explaining the particular constitution and mor-
phology of gangs. The ethnic and cultural clash between 
groups of recently arrived migrants of different origins who 
coexist in proximate urban enclaves and the confrontations 
between them and the host culture and institutions have 
frequently given rise to adaptive organizations that often 
become involved in illegal activities (Cohen 1955; Cloward 
and Ohlin 1960; Suttles 1968). The constitution of in-
stitutionalized gangs in several Central American countries, 
namely in El Salvador, Guatemala and Ecuador, is a par-
ticular example of this, since it is partly related to a “re-
verse” process of immigration. The maras in Central 
America resulted from the massive deportation of former 
members of Los Angeles gangs like MS 13 or Calle 18 (Zil-
berg 2007; Wolf 2010).15 In general these were second gen-
eration immigrants who had no previous contacts with 
their original homeland, but brought their gang traditions 
with them. The powerful cultural symbols that were part of 
15 Maras are a particular manifestation of Hagen-
dorn’s “institutional gangs”, composed of youth in-
volved in illegal activities who identify through bodily 
marks and dress style. What distinguishes maras is 
their origin in this process of reverse migration and 
the resulting cultural synthesis between their origins 
in the United States and their adaptation to the host 
national contexts which they were forced enter and 
accept after deportation (Hagedorn 2008b).
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these traditions were highly appealing to local marginalized 
youth that had gone through brutal civil wars.
According to several scholars, the appealing character of the 
gang culture and symbols in Central America results from 
its similarities with the culture of violence that existed dur-
ing the civil war years (Mosser and McIlwaine 2001; Cruz 
2003; Rodgers 2003; Santamaría 2006; Kedron and Bensen, 
2008). Hence, although gangs in Central America do not 
connect to the ideological tenets of former guerrilla organiz-
ations, they do at least aesthetically and in their opposition 
to the institutions that represent the legal order express re-
bellion through violent (forcible) behaviour. Savenije (2009: 
214) and Kurtenbach (2008) question aspects of the “culture 
of violence” thesis as a central explanation of the prolife-
ration of gangs in Central America. To them the fact that 
gangs provide a set of meaningful primary relationships and 
relevant identities for extremely deprived and marginalized 
youth has a far more important incidence on the process 
than the “violent” inheritance from previous civil war years.
It is interesting to note that despite Argentina being affected 
by many of the conditions that are associated with the in-
stitutionalization of gangs – such as political violence (espe-
cially in the 1970s), a very profound polarization of its social 
structure and a growing drug trade territorially based in 
slums and shanty towns – they have not “persisted for gener-
ations or reached the organizational level of their Rio 
counter parts, 1200 miles to the north” (Hagedorn 2008a: 14).
Instead of institutionalized gangs like Central American 
maras or Rio de Janeiro’s Comando Vermelho, what we 
mostly find in Argentina are what Hagedorn termed “un-
supervised peer groups” and we prefer to redefine as webs 
of juvenile delinquency. Morphologically, these webs are 
composed of a loose set of interpersonal relations where 
mutual identification is based, essentially, on a particular 
use of slang, fashion, tattoos and hairstyle defined as the 
“Crooked Kids” style. These social ties and styles develop 
in the free space provided by “un-ruled” and “un-pa-
trolled” public spaces (street corners, bars or squares) 
where a confrontational spirit against conventional society, 
the law and its representative institutions is developed as a 
core element of identification. These webs become a chan-
nel for primary affective bonds and a system of social roles 
where those who have been marginalized by conventional 
society may find a space where they can be recognized and 
follow a “career”. In sum, the webs become a “social habi-
tat” where poor and marginalized adolescents can find af-
fection, an identity and socially valued “positions” (at least 
among the peer group) for which they find no homologies 
in the official social system.
It is hard to untangle the reasons why the same factors that 
caused unsupervised peer groups to turn into in-
stitutionalized gangs in other parts of the world did not 
have the same effects in Argentina. We will offer some hy-
potheses in the concluding section of this article. But what 
these webs of juvenile delinquency clearly share with in-
stitutionalized gangs is their capacity to produce an iden-
tity and a meaningful existence in the face of extreme 
marginalization and deprivation. As has been increasingly 
recognized since the pioneering studies of the School of 
Cultural Studies in Birmingham (Clarke et al. [1975] 2002; 
Hebdige [1979] 2002), aesthetic styles and music are cen-
tral means not only of expressing but also of constituting 
these identities. The relevance of music and style in con-
stituting these rebel identities has more recently been redis-
covered by scholars such as Touraine (1995), Ferrel and 
Hamm (1998), Morales (2003) and Hagedorn (2008a: xvii).
Whereas hip hop seems to be the musical style adopted al-
most globally by institutionalized gangs as a means of ex-
pression and identification, in the case of Argentina a more 
local rhythm, Cumbia Villera (literally “Cumbia from the 
Slums”), condensed the identity that predominated during 
the 1990s among the webs of juvenile delinquency we de-
scribe.16 Cumbia Villera expressed a profound antagonism 
16 We studied the different manifestations of the 
Crooked Kids’ style as part of a prolonged research 
programme on juvenile delinquency between 1998 
and 2008. The research was based on intensive eth-
nographic fieldwork done in several contexts where 
we could observe the systems of social relationships 
that structure the webs of juvenile delinquency: 
prisons, rehab programmes, the juvenile penal sys-
tem, urban slums, street corners and squares. We 
also did participant observation in bailantas’, the 
dance halls where young people go to listen and 
dance to Cumbia Villera.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 240– 260
Isla and Míguez: Formations of Violence in Post-Dictatorial Contexts 254
towards the institutions that in the Crooked Kids’ view 
quintessentially represent the social order: the police and 
the politicians that participate in corrupt networks and 
subject them to their power and interests. But the slang 
that composes the lyrics of this musical style also denotes 
social categories that constitute the role and status system 
that gives the Crooked Kids a meaningful identity and their 
particular form of (subordinate) social integration. For 
reasons of space we will not describe this specific system 
here (see Míguez 2006; Vila and Semán 2010 for a more de-
tailed account). Instead we will concentrate on the basic 
symbols of identification and alterity that reveal the core of 
the Crooked Kids identity.
4. Cumbia Villera as Cultural Synthesis
Cumbia Villera is a variant of the traditional Cumbia that 
was originally developed in Colombia and arrived in Ar-
gentina in the 1960s, where it became very popular among 
the working classes as a romantic and festive type of music. 
The more prominent Cumbia Villera bands emerged in the 
early 1990s and lasted through that decade, before either 
disappearing or introducing changes in their style to aban-
don some of what were initially the more disruptive ele-
ments in their aesthetic and lyrics: the celebration of drugs 
and crime. During the 1990s when the formation of viol-
ence was at its peak and police/ civilian casualties and 
crime rates climbed substantially, Cumbia Villera dif-
ferentiated itself from traditional Cumbia by explicitly set-
ting out to express the experience of young poor people 
who consumed illegal drugs, came into conflict with the 
law and had been through prison. The covers of Cumbia 
Villera records provide clear examples of this identification 
with the world of crime.
Cover 1
(by Andrea Cardinalli for Leader Music SACIM)
Cover 2
(by Moya Design and Andrea Cardinalli for Leader Music SACIM)
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Cover 3 While cover 1 shows a typical “street corner group” killing 
time on a slum street, the others clearly evidence iden-
tification with drugs (marihuana is alluded in the three 
covers) and crime. The lyrics also celebrate drugs and 
crime as in “I want vitamins”:
Quiero Vitaminas  
I want vitamins [cocaine]  
(by Pablo Lescano)
[…] I can’t walk for sniffing so much.  
I’m worn out, and I’ve got no vitamins.  
I want to take [some more],  
I buy a bag and I’m full of zip again.
In addition to its identification with drugs and crime, 
Cumbia Villera also evidences a confrontational attitude 
towards society. This can be seen, for example, in the song 
“Tumberos” (“Tomb-boys”: tomb means jail in the 
Crooked Kids’ slang), which contains a very explicit men-
ace to those outside the world of crime (the song divides 
clearly between those who are outside the prison and “are 
going to die” from those who are inside and striving to get 
out to kill those outside).
Tumberos  
Tomb-boys  
(by Marcelo Moya and Edgar Navarra)
I’m from the tomb, I’m going to get out.  
Tomb-boy I am, let’s start the mutiny.  
Tomb-boy I am, I’m going to get out.  
And when I get out, you are going to die.
But even if it is possible to perceive a general con-
frontational attitude towards society in certain songs, most 
of them point to very specific types of alterity: essentially 
politicians and more specifically the police.
(by Martín Turalba for Leader Music SACIM)
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Ollas Vacías  
Empty Pans  
(by Omar Salto)
Empty bellies for our kids today  
And in parliament only negotiations  
We’re going to burn them in the middle of the square.  
You talk morality, and you’re on T.V.  
Politician sun of the beach, motherfucker ... People’s Feelings!
Ladrón de lo Sacaste  
Thief, where did you take it from?  
(by Pablo Lescano)
I have to ask for my freedom  
And they condemn me because I rob.  
Why me?  
When those who really steal are free.  
That means most of the politicians and policemen.
These two songs show how politicians and policemen were 
perceived during the 1990s (and in fact still are) as those 
mainly responsible for the state of deprivation and margi-
nalization that the Crooked Kids experienced in daily life. 
However, if the politicians were included as an “other”, it is 
the police that were perceived as the more extreme form of 
opposition.
Gatillo Fácil  
[Happy Trigger]  
(by Pablo Lescano)
They call him happy trigger,  
He killed that kid in the street that came in his way.  
He calls himself a macho,  
with his police shield, heavy gun and the right to kill.  
Don’t forget Cabezas, Bulacio, Bru and Bordón.17  
The list is so long I can’t mention them all.  
Hope God saves you from being the next in the queue.
This song, whose content is similar to fifteen or twenty 
other songs by other Cumbia Villera bands, shows that 
the police were perceived as a power that not only repre-
sented the law within the local space – the corner or the 
square – of the young urban poor. The police were also 
seen as a power that acts outside the law. At the same time 
as the police is seen as abusing power while persecuting 
those “outside the law”, they are also seen as in conflict 
with the legal order committing the same type of crimes 
that they supposedly persecute but with the protection 
and impunity that comes from being a state power. In this 
way the opposition to the police that partly defines the 
Crooked Kids identity was based on an image of this in-
stitution shared by most of the population: the police ap-
peared as a corrupt and arbitrary force more interested in 
defending their own corporate interests than the legal 
order as such. This is an image that was particularly 
strong in the suburban slums (Puex 2003; Isla and Manci-
ni 2008).
 In sum, the confrontation between the police and the 
Crooked Kids was not only a conflict between the legal 
order and those who trespass against it. It was also a con-
frontation between two types of criminal groupings en-
gaged in an unequal dispute over power and material 
resources. Hence, the logic of mutual confrontation ex-
pressed in the growth of lethal police/civilian encounters in 
the 1990s was partly based in an opposition between (legal 
and illegal) orders. But, in addition, it also resulted from a 
confrontation between a paradoxically illegal – and in that 
sense arbitrary – state authority and those who resisted the 
abuses of this capricious power.
Besides the songs, these confrontational logics were also ex-
pressed in the ways in which the Crooked Kids tattooed 
their bodies. Good examples of this are the “Crooked Kids’ 
saint” (an image of a saint smoking marihuana that offers 
protection from the police to young criminals) or the“five 
dots” mark or the knife killing a snake (see images below) 
which manifest enmity against the police.
17 These are the names of some of the more re-
nowned people kidnapped and killed by the police 
since the return of democracy.
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Image 1 These images may be found in the street refuges where the 
Crooked Kids transit during the day or stay at night or 
painted on walls. But identity rites also require them to be 
tattooed publicly on different parts of the body. Initially, at 
the beginning of the 1990s, the tattoos were placed on vis-
ible parts of the body, like the forearm or chest. Since this 
made the Crooked Kids easily identifiable to the police, 
they began to put the tattoos on less visible parts of the 
body, but that could still be shown to fellow members of 
their groups. The fact that the tattoos had to be done in 
public, by a close companion, shows that it is part of a rite 
of passage in the strict sense of the term. The tattoos 
strongly mark membership and identity; they are a point of 
no return, since those who have the tattoos know that if 
they are detained by the police they face harsh reprisals, if 
not death. Thus, tattoos are not only an aesthetic mark of 
identification, they define a pattern of interaction and pro-
duce specific bodily experiences – to be tortured or killed – 
for those who bore the identification mark (Míguez 2002).
 At this stage it is paramount to stress that this con-
frontational identity assumed by the Crooked Kids through 
these symbols and practices was a reaction or counterpart to 
the actions and rhetoric of the political and administrative 
leaders of the police forces who adopted iron fist policies. 
The heads of the police organizations often identified the 
young and poor from the urban outskirts as dangerous and 
a menace to the common citizen and the social order. In line 
with this rhetoric, the mere demeanour of a youngster 
could expose him to police reprisals, jail and torture only 
for loitering in the street or having an “attitude” towards 
authority, even if they might not have committed any crime.
5. Conclusions
The particular formation of violence that emerged in Ar-
gentina during the 1990s and lasted until the initial years of 
the twenty-first century resulted from the confluence of 
two main factors. One of these was growing levels of un-
employment, marginalization and structural poverty that 
affected mainly the young urban poor. As in other cases in 
Latin and North America, this context favoured the emerg-
ence of juvenile oppositional identities where groups of 
“young and poor” could find alternative forms of social re-
cognition and integration. Notably, delinquent identities in 
Crooked kids’ saint painted in an institute’s wall.
Image 2
Five dots mark and knife tattoed in an inmate’s arm.
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Argentina did not turn into stable organizations akin to 
North American gangs or Central American maras. In-
stead, the forms of integration and recognition in Ar-
gentine delinquent identities took place in more loose 
social webs where individuals identified by sharing com-
mon moral and aesthetic codes.
 The current state of comparative research makes the rea-
sons behind this contrast hard to unveil. However, our re-
search suggests a few plausible hypotheses open for further 
exploration. On the one hand, the Argentine oppositional 
identities did not have a strong ethnic component. Accord-
ing to classical and current research, racial contrasts and 
immigration are a significant force behind the emergence 
of institutionalized gangs. Although Argentina had strong 
waves of migration at the end of the nineteenth century 
and between the 1930s and 1960s, these did not rise to eth-
nically organized gangs with an intergenerational perdur-
ance. Hence, in contrast with what happened, for example, 
in the United States, race is not an element of “distinction” 
and confrontation among members of different gangs.18
Another factor associated with institutionalized gangs is their 
predisposition to imitate former armed political organiz-
ations or for these organizations to abandon (at least to a 
great extent) their original political ends and turn into com-
mon criminal structures. The webs of juvenile delinquency in 
Argentina developed essentially in the 1990s, long after the 
armed political organizations had been eradicated by the bru-
tal repressive methods of the dictatorship (1976–1983). 
Hence, in contrast with the Central American cases where 
gangs often developed in connection with armed groups or 
directly after civil wars, in Argentina the time lapse between 
the presence of armed political organizations in the 1970s and 
the Crooked Kids of the 1990s possibly precluded political or-
ganizations turning into criminal gangs or unsupervised peer 
groups inheriting the organizational strategies of the former.
Another factor that underlies the constitution of in-
stitutionalized gangs is the drug trade in “defensible” 
urban enclaves that can be removed from state control. 
These conditions are clearly present in many Argentine 
cities. However, although one may find certain groups of 
young people involved in drug trafficking, who even may 
exert certain levels of control and power in a particular ter-
ritory, they thus far have not evolved into stable organiz-
ations with specific symbols or a strong corporate spirit.
It is hard to fully explain this contrast with the Central Ameri-
can or Brazilian examples. One possible reason is that, in this 
respect, the conditions conducive to the growth of stable in-
stitutionalized gangs only lasted for a limited period in Ar-
gentina. As we saw in the data described above, criminal 
activity and violence resulting in police/civilian casualties 
reached its peak during the 1990s, but it was not as present 
during the 1980s and seems to be declining since 2002 or 
2003. Hence, the limited duration of the process might be pre-
cluding the emergence of stable organizations and identities.
Another factor might be the power asymmetry between 
unsupervised peer groups and the coalitions generated by 
collusion between the police and elements of the political 
system that re-emerged in the 1990s. The traditions that 
originally accrued in the security forces favoured collusion 
between elements of the political system and the police to 
run illegal activities. During the 1976–1983 dictatorship 
the security forces became used not only to administering 
crimes, but to directly participating in the organization and 
command of criminal groups, displacing or eliminating 
common criminal gangs. Although in the 1980s these prac-
tices remained relatively dormant, they were revived in the 
1990s. This suggests that the lack of stable institutionalized 
gangs may be due to the fact that the control of the types of 
illegal activity that are usually associated with in-
stitutionalized gangs were (and still are) to a great extent 
governed by official powers that obstruct the development 
of parallel competing organizations.
Now, if this ambivalent character of public organs vicari-
ously and paradoxically hindered the development of in-
18 There are however certain embryonic organiz-
ations in some slums in Buenos Aires city, where the 
drug trade is being by groups of recent migrants. 
However, this is not an extensive phenomenon and 
has not so far led to open confrontations between 
ethnically identified gangs.
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stitutionalized gangs, it also enhanced the levels of 
resentment among adolescents and may also explain the 
growth of lethal police/civilian encounters that took place 
in the 1990s. The recurrent involvement in criminal ac-
tivities of state agents that are supposed, at least sym-
bolically, to embody a basic social consensus turns them 
into an arbitrary and, as such, at least partially illegitimate 
power. Hence, the Argentine formation of violence of the 
1990s may be partly based on a configuration of irreconcil-
able enemies divided by the “rule” of law. But, since this 
“rule of law” was actually circumstantial to the actors in-
volved and other random factors, the increase in lethal po-
lice/civilian encounters that is part of this formation of 
violence may have also resulted from the anomic social at-
mosphere that predominated in Argentina during those 
years.
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